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The use of corporate conglomerate structures has become one of the most domi-
nant forms of business in many national and international industrial and commercial
sectors. For this reason, it is essential that such operations are subject to proper
legal and financial control insofar as they may otherwise create additional forms
of risk not covered by existing commercial laws or regulatory practices.
Although the 1990s have experienced a large amount of industrial restructuring
through the disposal of various noncore activities in many sectors, the develop-
ment of increasingly complex conglomerate structures in the financial services
area remains one of the most important forms of business expansion.' The devel-
opment of appropriate legal responses to the difficulties created by these new
conglomerate forms of business has, however, been slow until now.
One specific difficulty that arises in connection with the development of finan-
cial conglomerates or mixed conglomerates, which include at least one financial
component in addition to their industrial or commercial operations, is that new
forms of financial exposure or legal risk arise as a result of the new commercial
and corporate relationships created within the conglomerate in response to which it
is essential that new forms of financial supervision and regulation are developed.2
Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article in any not-for-
profit publication or handout provided such reproduction acknowledges original publication in this
issue of The International Lawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the author.
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1. For a study of recent trends in international banking, securities, and derivatives markets, see
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (BIS), INTERNATIONAL BANKING & FINANCIAL MARKETS
DEVELOPMENTS (July 1994).
2. For the purposes of this article, the term regulation refers to the body of legal rules and
regulations or administrative requirements established by financial authorities in order to limit or
control the risks assumed by banks and other financial institutions. The term supervision refers to
the associated or complementary process of monitoring compliance by financial institutions with
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The need to develop appropriate supervisory systems and regulatory controls
is also particularly necessary in light of the increasing pressures on national
and international financial markets generally3 and of the recent, more specific,
instances of financial collapse through poor trading and fraud.4 The significant
global opportunities for further market expansion created under the interim GATS
arrangements, agreed in July 1995, 5 also make this a matter of urgent attention.
This article considers some of the basic issues that arise in connection with
the development of conglomerate forms of business in the financial services area.
Some of the more important recent developments at the international and European
levels are then reviewed. Some provisional conclusions are also drawn and tenta-
tive recommendations made for the further development of the law in this area.
I. Conglomerate Structures
The term conglomerate can be used to refer to any form of business structure
that involves at least two distinct forms of industrial activity or service provision.
6
these provisions. See generally EDWARD P.M. GARDENER, THEORY AND PRACTICE IN BANKING
SUPERVISION: SOME REFLECTIONS (1986); DAVID LLEWELLYN, THE REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1986).
3. See generally R.M. PECCHIOLL, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVEL-
OPMENT (OECD), THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF BANKING: THE POLICY ISSUES (1983); J.R.S.
REVELL, OECD, BANKING AND ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS (1983); OECD, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN SERVICES: BANKING (1984); OECD, TRENDS IN BANKING IN OECD COUNTRIES (1985);
T.R.G. BINGHAM, OECD, BANKING AND MONETARY POLICY (1985); GUNTHER BROKER, OECD,
COMPETITION IN BANKING (1989); INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), BANKING CRISES:
CASES AND ISSUES (V. Sundararajan & Tomas J.T. Balino eds., 1991); OECD, BANKS UNDER
STRESS (1992); OECD, TRANSFORMATION OF THE BANKING SYSTEM: PORTFOLIO RESTRUCTURING,
PRIVATISATION AND THE PAYMENT SYSTEM (1993). See also UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS (UNCTC), TRANSNATIONAL BANKS: OPERATIONS, STRATEGIES AND THEIR
EFFECTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1981); UNCTC, TRANSNATIONAL BANKS AND THE INTERNA-
TIONAL DEBT CRISIS (1991); UNCTC, TRANSNATIONAL BANKS AND THE EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS
OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: IMPACT OF REGULATORY CHANGES (1992).
4. In connection with the collapse of the Bank for Credit and Commerce International (BCCI),
see generally REPORT INTO THE SUPERVISION OF THE BANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL
(HMSO, London, Oct. 22, 1992); JOHN KERRY & HANK BROWN, THE BCCI AFFAIR, REPORT TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 7, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992). In connection with the collapse of Barings, see BANK OF ENGLAND, REPORT OF THE BOARD
OF BANKING SUPERVISION INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS (1995).
5. Under the interim arrangements agreed to in Brussels on July 26, 1995, although without
the full support of the United States, 90% of world financial services, in more than 90 countries,
will be covered by the new trade liberalization measures, which will last until the end of 1997. This
market is estimated to be worth US$20,000 billion each in terms of world banking assets and deposits,
US$10,000 billion of world stock market capitalization, US$10,000 billion of listed bonds, and
US$2,000 billion of world insurance premiums. The total global market for financial services is
estimated to be worth some US$50 trillion. For an initial report on the interim GATS arrangements,
see Frances Williams, Financial Services Deal Sidelines the U.S., FIN. TIMES, July 27, 1995, at 5,
and World Trade Organization (WTO), WTO Director-General Hails Financial Services Accord,
WTO Press Release No. 18 (July 26, 1995).
6. See generally JAMES MAYCOCK, FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES: THE NEW PHENOMENON
(1986); CHARLES R. SPRUILL, CONGLOMERATES AND THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITALISM (1982);
HARRY MCVEA, FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES AND THE CHINESE WALL (1993). Sir Timothy Bevan,
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This usually involves groups of companies in one, or more, industrial or commer-
cial sectors. A conglomerate, however, may also consist of a single corporate
entity that provides more than one distinct industrial or commercial service.'
Although the term conglomerate can clearly be applied to industrial or commer-
cial companies, or groups of companies, special difficulties arise with regard to
financial conglomerates. From the above, a financial conglomerate is a single
company, or group of companies, which provides at least two distinct forms of
financial service. This will include, for example, an integrated investment house
that provides a range of financial services through internal Chinese Walls,8 or
a group of connected financial companies with the most recent serious concerns
arising in connection with the provision of banking, securities, and insurance
services from within the same group.
A mixed, or mixed-activity, conglomerate is a group of companies involved
in various industrial or commercial sectors with at least one unit which provides
financial services from one of the three principal areas of activity noted. 9
II. Conglomerate Development
The first large conglomerates in the United Kingdom and the United States
emerged in the 1960s. Two of the earliest examples were Ling-Temco-Vought,
in the United States, and Slater Walker, in the United Kingdom. Both were noted
for the absence of any relationship between the various activities undertaken by
their component elements and for their early collapse.l1
In the United Kingdom, the growth of financial conglomerates began in the
1960s with the expansion of the range of services provided by the large deposit
banks through the establishment, or acquisition, of subsidiary service companies.
By the mid 1970s most deposit banks had a large number of subsidiary companies
providing a wide range of financial services.11 The use of conglomerate business
structures subsequently spread from the deposit banks to the merchant banks,
Banking Conglomerates: Revolution or Evolution? BARCLAYS BANK REV., Aug. 1985, at 56. For
a U.S. perspective, see Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, International Standards for Consolidated Supervision
of Financial Conglomerates: Controlling Systemic Risk, 19 BROOK. J. INTL LAW 137 (1993).
7. See MAYCOCK, supra note 6, at 2.
8. In connection with such single company service provision, one particular recent area of
concern which has arisen in the United Kingdom is the abuse of trading privileges by market makers
who are allowed to trade under cover on their own accounts in the U.K. markets. The Securities
and Investments Board, which is responsible for the regulation of the provision of investment services
in the United Kingdom under the Financial Services Act of 1986, recently completed an 18-month
review into the privileges available to market makers on the London Stock Exchange following an
earlier report of the Office of Fair Trading. See SECURITIES AND INVESTMENT BOARD, EQUITY
MARKET REVIEW REPORT (June 21, 1995).
9. The specific difficulties which arise in connection with mixed conglomerates are discussed
further below. See discussion infra part VI.E.2.n.
10. See MAYCOCK, supra note 6, at 2; see also CHARLES RAY, SLATER WALKER-AN INVESTIGA-
TION OF A FINANCIAL PHENOMENON (1977).
11. See MAYCOCK, supra note 6, ch. 3.
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discount houses,12 savings institutions, securities houses, investment groups, and
subsequently, to insurance companies. 13
On the European continent, the development of financial conglomerates was
not as spectacular since substantial market growth was possible through internal
expansion on a Swiss/German universal banking model, which allows the provi-
sion of both commercial and investment banking services from within the same
corporate unit. 14 Of more importance in terms of recent conglomerate develop-
ment, however, has been the substantial increase in the number of Bancassurance
or Bancaffianz groups, 5 especially in Germany and France.' 6 These groups pro-
vide both banking and insurance services from within the same group, with the
banking parent or subsidiary company, or companies, usually already providing
commercial and investment banking services on the universal banking model. '
7
Although this structure may initially only involve the sale of retail banking services
combined with life assurance,' 8 corporate investment banking as well as general
insurance coverage may subsequently be developed subject to local regulatory
restriction.' 9
During the 1980s and 1990s, conglomerate business structures grew substan-
tially in Europe. This was possible through the deregulation of many domestic
markets as well as with the general globalization of financial markets, which
occurred as a result of the removal of many restrictions on the free movement
of capital and improvements in telecommunications facilities and computer tech-
nology.
In the United States, the early development of financial conglomerates was
12. In the United Kingdom, a discount house is an agent bank of the Bank of England in the
primary money market or discount market. See DAVID J. GOACHER, THE MONETARY AND FINANCIAL
SYSTEM 67-70 (1990); PAUL HOWELLS & KEITH BAIN, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS
94-102 (1990); JOHN GILBODY, THE UK MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM 127-31 (1991).
13. See MAYCOCK, supra note 6, ch. 4.
14. In regulatory terms, a distinction has been drawn between institutional regulation on the
European continent and functional regulation in the United Kingdom, which is more concerned with
the type of financial service provided than the type of institution.
15. This is sometimes referred to as structural diffusion or structural arbitrage. The use of
structural forms of control to limit loss in financial markets is discussed infra part V.
16. By June 1994, over 200 bank-assurance groups were estimated to exist within Europe. See
Katherine Coates & Chris Ffinch, A Single Passport for Insures-Where Next?, EFSL, June 1994,
at 49, 50.
17. See generally Philip Woolfson, "Bancassurance" and Community Law: Current Status and
Expected Developments, 12 J. INT'L Bus. L. 519 (1994); Nicholas O'Niell, Supervision of Financial
Conglomerates, 12 J. INT'L Bus. L. 235 (1994).
18. With regard to European practice, while the term insurance may be used to refer to life and
nonlife (risk) cover, the term assurance is used to refer specifically to life insurance.
19. For a study into the measurement and assessment of the relative efficiency of banking and
bancassurance strategies through financial ratio analysis and data envelopment analysis, see Margaret
Brown & Edward P. Gardener, Bancassurance and European Banking Strategies: An Exploratory
Analysis Using DEA of the Concept and Treatment of "Relative Efficiency" (Sept. 1994) (paper
presented to the Annual Conference of the European Association of University Teachers in Banking
and Finance, University of Modena, Italy).
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limited due to restraints on branch banking, imposed under the McFadden Act
of 1927, and more significantly with the functional separation of commercial
banking and investment banking introduced under the Glass-Steagall provisions
contained in the Banking Act of 1933.20 Considerable business expansion was,
however, subsequently possible, through the continued extension of national bank
powers, and the use of bank holding companies2' and their section 20 subsidiar-
ies.22 Expansion was also possible overseas, for example, through the use of
Edge Act Corporations subject to the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation K.23
While many of the barriers imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act have been eroded
through expansive interpretation of bank and bank holding company powers by
federal regulators, the provisions still secure the fundamental separation of the
commercial and investment banking industries in the United States.
Despite the Hunt Commission's investigation in 1970, significant legislative
deregulation was not introduced at the federal level in the United States until
the 1980 Depository Institutions Protection Act and the 1982 Garn-St Germain
Depository Institutions Act.24 Even then, progress was not substantial. Although
there have been other proposals for the abolition, or at least revision, of the
Glass-Steagall Act and of the more penal provisions of the Bank Holding Company
Act, none has yet been successful. More substantial progress may, however, be
20. See generally James E. Smith, Glass-Steagall Act-A History of Its Legislative Origins and
Regulatory Construction, 92 BANKING L.J. 38 (1975); Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial
and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483 (1971); H. Parker Willis, The Banking
Act of 1933 in Operation, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1935); Roberta S. Karmel, Glass-Steagall: Some
Critical Reflections, 97 BANKING L.J. 631 (1980). For more recent commentary, see generally Joseph
J. Norton, Up Against "the Wall ": Glass-Steagall and the Dilemma of a Deregulated "Regulated"
Banking Environment, 42 Bus. LAW. 327 (1987); Keith R. Fisher, Reviewing the Safety Net: Bank
Diversification into Securities and Insurance Activities, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 (1992); George
G. Kaufman & Larry R. Mate, Glass-Steagall: Repeal by Regulatory and Judicial Reinterpretation,
107 BANKING L.J. 388 (1990); Joseph J. Norton, Demise of the Glass-Steagall Act: A Study in Policy
Indeterminates (Sept. 1995) (paper presented to the annual conference of the European Association of
University Teachers in Banking and Finance, University of Valencia, Spain).
21. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 provided that the activity involved could be deter-
mined to be so closely related as to be a proper incident to banking and be reasonably expected to
bring public benefits in the form of greater convenience, increased competition, or efficiency gains,
which outweigh any possible adverse effects of undue concentration, decreased or unfair competition,
conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices. See JOSEPH J. NORTON & SHERRY C. WHITLEY,
BANKING LAW MANUAL §§ 4.04, 4.07, 5.06 (1983 & Supp. 1995). Following the adoption of the
Bank Holding Company Act, and after a slow initial development, by 1980, over 200 multibank
holding companies had been established in the United States, in contrast to 2,426 one-bank holding
companies. See MAYCOCK, supra note 6, at 37.
22. See NORTON & WHITLEY, supra note 21, § 4.04; see also Lichtenstein, supra note 6.
23. An "Edge Act" corporation is a federally chartered international banking or financial corpora-
tion set up under § 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act of 1919 as amended, inter alia, by the 1978
International Banking Act. See NORTON & WHITLEY, supra note 21, § 15.03[1]-[9].
24. These measures facilitated, inter alia, greater equality between depository institutions and
the granting of new powers to thrift institutions to compete with banks, as well as the cross-border
acquisition of certain institutions experiencing difficulty.
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possible under the provisions of the 1995 Financial Services Competitiveness
Act, which is currently before the United States Congress.25
Although there have been regular calls for reform, special difficulties also
remain with regard to the relationship between the banking and insurance indus-
tries in the United States.2 6 Since the reversal of Paul v. Virginia27 by the Supreme
Court in Southern-Eastern Underwriters Association in 1944,28 and the adoption
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945, the insurance industry has been subject
to strict regulation at the state level due to the threat of federal intervention in
the event that such control was considered insufficiently effective.29
National banks and bank holding companies have also been restricted from
acting as insurance agents, with the exception of national banks in small communi-
ties.3° At the same time, bank holding companies are prohibited from owning
substantial nonbank subsidiaries, unless properly incidental to their banking busi-
ness and of sufficient public benefit.3' Some significant recent developments in
this area may, however, extend banks' powers in this regard.32
25. The Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1995 was drafted by Congressman Jim Leach,
chair of the U.S. House of Representatives Banking and Financial Services Committee, to end the
separation of commercial and investment banking industries. Under this bill, bank and securities
companies are to be allowed to own each other, subject to certain protections, although banks involved
with government-insured deposits will have to use a holding company structure to establish effective
firewalls between the banking and nonbanking risks. See George Graham, Bank Reform Bill Gathers
Wide Support, FIN. TIMES, May 4, 1995, at 8. The bill was, however, incorporated into a larger
regulatory reform measure in October 1995.
26. The House Banking Committee approved the controversial Baker Affiliation Amendment
on June 28, 1995, by a 36-12 vote. This would allow national banks to affiliate with insurance
companies in a holding company structure in states that permitted state-chartered banks to have
insurance affiliates. Although Congressman Leach had attempted to exclude any extension of banks'
powers to engage in insurance business from being included in the Financial Services Competitiveness
Act, on June 28, 1995, concessions were accepted in connection with the moratorium on new bank
insurance powers. See 65 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 3 (July 3, 1995).
27. Paul v. Virginia, 231 U.S. 495 (1869).
28. United States v. Southern-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
29. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress insisted that the regulation of the insurance
industry was a matter for federal control, following the reversal of the decision in Paul v. Virginia,
which had held that insurance was not interstate commerce. Under the Act, however, states were
allowed to continue to regulate their own industries provided they did so effectively. See EMMErr
J. VAUGHAN & CURTIS M. ELLIOTr, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE ch. 10 (5th ed.
1989).
30. See NORTON & WHITLEY, supra note 21, § 4.07.
31. Id. § 4.07[2].
32. See American Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1992) (dealing with title
insurance agency business); Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (eliminating geographical limitations on the solicitation of insurance customers by national
banks); Nationsbank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810
(1995) (authorizing national banks to sell fixed annuities). For comment, see Debra D. King, Judicial
Expansion of National Banks' Insurance Powers: The Resurrection and Statutory Interpretation of
Section 92 of the National Bank Act, 19 IOWA J. CORP. L. 833 (1994); Catherine E. Heigel, Case
Comment, Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v. Ludwig and Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Co. v. Clarke: The Banking-Insurance War in Search of a Judicial Truce, 55 OHIO ST.
L.J. 929 (1994).
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Despite the current legislative proposals before Congress, the restrictive nature
of the prohibitive or exclusionary formal regulatory climate in the United States
clearly contrasts with the general global development of more integrated forms
of business structures involving financial and mixed conglomerates, the growth
of which clearly requires urgent regulatory attention.
Before considering the recent supervisory and regulatory developments that
have occurred in this area, the basic advantages and corresponding risks that
arise with regard to the use of conglomerate business structures in the financial
services area are considered.
III. Conglomerate Advantage
Conglomerate structures have become important in terms of business strategy
due to the significant improvements possible in terms of operational efficiency
and effectiveness. These benefits arise from economies of scope and scale, which
generate lower costs, reduced prices, and improved product and service innova-
tion. At the same time, sector synergies can substantially increase the general
competitiveness of the business. The stability of each of the structural components
of a particular organization, as well as the business as a whole, can also be
significantly improved through diversified revenues and risks. At the same time,
product variety and innovation can increase customer loyalty as well as market
penetration and market development.
Against the perceived benefits of conglomeration, however, must be set the
possible dangers of resource depletion and concentration as well as new or aggra-
vated forms of financial or legal risk, which arise especially with regard to the
mixing of commercial and investment banking and banking and insurance services
within a single business unit.
IV. Conglomerate Risk
A number of specific difficulties arise in connection with the use of conglomer-
ate business structures, such as with regard to management autonomy, corporate
transparency, and the control of conflicts of interest. 33 The most important issue
that arises from a regulatory perspective, however, is the identification and control
of the additional financial exposures created through this form of business.
These exposures are created from combining the traditionally separate market
risks involved with banking, securities, and insurance activities, and, more specif-
ically, from the creation of new relationships or dependencies between these
traditionally distinct categories of risk, with the danger of contagion and possible
systemic or market collapse then arising. Any new or aggravated forms of risk
created by the use of conglomerates in national and international markets must,
33. See infra part VI.B. 1.
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therefore, be properly identified and assessed to allow appropriate corrective
action to be taken.
Although the spread of financial exposure through contagion can occur in any
distinct financial market, the most severe difficulties arise with regard to banks
and other forms of depository and lending institutions. The basic difficulty which
arises is that such institutions fund themselves short through the acceptance of
retail or corporate deposits, often repayable on demand, or through short-term
wholesale borrowing, 34 and then on-lend the repackaged funds to retail or corpo-
rate borrowers, on a medium- to long-term basis. The effect is to create an
essentially illiquid asset base in the form of a portfolio of medium- to long-term
loans through short-term borrowing. This mismatching of maturities31 creates
significant funding risks in the form of liquidity shortages which must be carefully
managed by the institution.36 At the same time, credit exposures are created on
the asset side in the form of possible repayment default by one or more borrowers
on their outstanding commitments.
An institution will always hold a certain amount of cash or other form of liquid
assets to cover anticipated ongoing withdrawal demands.37 Systemic dangers may
still, however, arise from the possibility that unexpectedly large amounts of
withdrawal requests may be made at any particular time, which liquidity shortages
may be aggravated by outstanding credit defaults. Although the institution may
still be technically solvent, it will not be able to meet withdrawal demands once
the reserves have been exhausted, due to the fact that the largest part of the
institution's asset base will be held in the form of illiquid loans. In such a case, the
institution will have to borrow more funds from the wholesale markets although its
ability to do so may have been adversely affected by a revised credit standing.
34. In the United Kingdom, short-term wholesale borrowing generally is effected through the
Parallel or Secondary Money Markets, which comprise the Local Authority Market, the Finance
House Market, the Inter-Company Market, the Sterling Inter-Bank Market, the Sterling CD Market,
and the Sterling Commercial Paper Market. These markets developed in the late 1950s and 1960s
following the closure of the Public Works Loan Account in 1958. The Secondary Money Markets
in the United Kingdom have to be distinguished from the Primary or Discount Market in which the
Bank of England acts as the United Kingdom's central bank through its agents, the discount houses,
to adjust the volume of market liquidity on a daily basis. See generally GOACHER, supra note 12;
HOWELLS & BAIN, supra note 12; GILBODY, supra note 12.
35. Maturity mismatching or maturity transformation is an integral part of the general process
of financial intermediation. See generally HOWELLS & BAIN, supra note 12, ch. 3.
36. This is referred to as liability risk management in connection with the rolling over of short-term
wholesale deposits although liquidity shortages may also clearly arise as a result of unexpected
withdrawal demands; see infra.
37. This is traditionally referred to as fractional reserve banking, whereby a proportion or fraction
of the institution's deposit base is held in reserve to cover anticipated withdrawal demands. The
relevance of the phrase, however, is now less certain in light of the extensive credit facilities now
available on modem inter-bank markets. Banks, accordingly, no longer have to be as concerned
with the size of their underlying deposit base in light of the substantial amount of wholesale short-term
funding available. To this extent, modem banking can be said to have moved from being deposit
to asset driven, with the focus being on the development of a substantial asset portfolio rather than
protection of its underlying deposit base.
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Failing that, the institution will have to approach the relevant central bank for
additional funding through its lender of last resort operations .3 8
The liquidity difficulties experienced by one institution may then be transferred
to another, either through actual payment default by the first institution on its
interbank commitments or through a separate run by depositors on the second
institution. The stability of the market as a whole can then be threatened as the
exposure spreads to other banking institutions. In the absence of central bank
support, the result may be market or systemic collapse.
If a bank has to attempt to dispose of its loan portfolio, substantial losses on
the nominal value of the loan book may be incurred since purchasing institutions
will not be able to make the same credit assessment determinations as made by
the disposing institution at the time the loan was originally authorized. As a result
of this, the purchasing institution will insist on some level of discount. 39 To avoid
such fire sales, regulators may attempt to secure a rescue of some form for a
distressed institution, failing which, outstanding claims against the bank will be
dealt with under the relevant deposit guarantee or insurance scheme or local
insolvency law.4°
Although the dangers of systemic collapse in modem financial markets are
38. With regard to lender of last resort operations, a distinction can be drawn between a central
bank's general responsibilities to monitor market liquidity for monetary policy purposes and its
responsibility to assist individual institutions experiencing internal liquidity difficulties.
In terms of nineteenth century theory, the central bank would only assist an institution in difficulty
in cases where the institution was illiquid but solvent in terms of its total asset base, unless the
collapse of the particular institution would affect the stability of the market as a whole.
Financial support would, however, only be made available on a discretionary basis, to avoid moral
hazard difficulties arising. With the removal of the possibility of financial loss, the credit managers
of banks would undertake additional risks to generate further income. Shareholders, depositors, and
other creditors will also have no incentive to exercise any form of control over the management of
the business due to the removal of the risk of financial loss.
With regard to very large banks, this has led to the expression "too big to fail" in that due to
their size it is assumed that the central bank would always have to support them to avoid market
collapse. See generally HENRY THORNTON, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF THE
PAPER CREDIT OF GREAT BRITAIN (1802); WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET (1873). See also
Thomas M. Humphrey, Lender of Last Resort: The Concept in History, 75:2 FED. RESERVE BANK
RICHMOND ECON. REV., Mar./Apr. 1989, at 8; CHARLES A.E. GOODHART, MONEY, INFORMATION
AND UNCERTAINTY 176 (1989); LLEWELLYN, supra note 2.
Moral hazard difficulties also arise with regard to deposit protection or insurance schemes in that
depositors, and possibly all other creditors, will again fail to exercise any control over the activities
of a particular institution if the terms of the relevant protection scheme will always cover their losses.
See generally IMF, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS ptS. I, III (Patrick Downes & Reza
Vaez-Zadeh eds., 1991); IMF, CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS (Robert C.
Effros ed., 1992) [hereinafter CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES].
39. This may result in a fire sale where there is a substantial loss on the disposal of the loan
book, although this may not necessarily be the case depending upon the quality of the specific assets
held.
40. For a discussion of the historical background of purchase and assumption arrangements in
the United States and the difficulties that arise with regard to full cover deposit protection, see Richard
Dale, Deposit Insurance: Policy Clash over EC and US Reforms (1993) (Special Paper No. 53, on
file with the London School of Economics Financial Markets Group). See also Dirk Schoenmaker,
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considerably limited due to the sophisticated nature of the markets and the ability
of central bank authorities to monitor and adjust market liquidity for general
monetary policy and market stability purposes, a number of factors aggravate
the risk of contagion and systemic collapse. 41 These factors include the higher
levels of risk undertaken by financial institutions as national and international
price competition places increasing pressure on profit margins; the greater interde-
pendence created between separate national and financial markets through im-
provements in telecommunications, deregulation, and globalization of financial
services; and the increasing levels of exposure created through developments in
42national and international payment and settlement systems.
The use of the conglomerate structure itself may also increase both the internal
and external risks of contagion. Due to the close relationships created between
the distinct parts of the conglomerate, any loss or financial difficulty experienced
by one component may be more easily transferred to other parts of the group.
This transfer of exposure may arise, for example, through direct intra-group
loans or payment arrangements or cross-shareholdings, or simply as a result of
43damaged confidence being transferred by the market to other parts of the group.
More importantly, the risk of contagion is also created between different finan-
cial sectors as loss in one traditionally distinct market may be transferred to a
separate market in which the same conglomerate is involved. The creation of
the risk of market instability through loss transference within a single group is
possibly the most significant danger created by the use of conglomerate forms
of business."
Home Country Deposit Insurance (1992) (Special Paper No. 43, on file with the London School of
Economics Financial Markets Group); EDWARD J. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS IN FEDERAL DE-
POSIT INSURANCE (1985).
41. In connection with whether markets are inherently stable or unstable, see Hyman P. Minsky,
A Theory of Systemic Fragility in FINANCIAL CRISES: INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS IN A FRAGILE
ENVIRONMENT (Edward L. Altman & Arnold W. Sametz eds., 1977); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER,
MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (1978); EDWARD P. DAVIS, DEBT,
FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND SYSTEMIC RISK (1992).
42. In connection with the general systemic dangers involved in payment systems and the move
towards real-time gross settlement in Europe, see generally Developments in Wholesale Payment
Systems, 32 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 449 (1992); Dirk Schoenmaker, Externalities in Payment Systems:
Issues for Europe (Sept. 1993) (Special Paper, on file with the London School of Economics Financial
Markets Group); Brian Quinn, The UK approach to controlling risk in large-value payment systems,
33 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 530 (1993); The Development of a real-time gross settlement system, 34
BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 163 (1994). See also BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (BIS), LARGE
VALUE FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS IN THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES (1992); EUROPEAN COMMIS-
SION, EASIER CROSS-BORDER PAYMENTS: BREAKING DOWN THE BARRIERS (1992); AD Hoc WORK-
ING GROUP ON EC PAYMENT SYSTEMS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ISSUES OF COMMON CONCERN TO
EC CENTRAL BANKS IN THE FIELD OF PAYMENT SYSTEMS (1992); AD Hoc WORKING GROUP ON
EC PAYMENT SYSTEMS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN EC MEMBER STATES (1992);
C.E.V. BoRio ET AL., THE NATURE AND MANAGEMENT OF PAYMENT SYSTEM RISKS (1993).
43. See infra parts VI.B.2.a. and VI.E.2.c.
44. See generally Richard Dale, Regulating Investment Business in the Single Market, 34 BANK
ENG. Q. BULL. 333 (1994); Richard Dale, Regulating Banks' Securities Activities: A Global Assess-
ment, 1991 J. INT'L SEC. MARKETS 277, 286.
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In contrast with banking markets, securities markets are not subject to the
same inherent dangers of systemic collapse due to the absence of maturity mis-
matching, in particular, as they will generally fund their trading activities through
the issuance of short-term subordinated debt which may often be secured. 45 Diffi-
culties can still arise, however, for example, where a securities house has a large
portfolio of securities or a number of open positions which may be difficult to
dispose of, or close quickly, or as a result of settlement system failures.
6
While banking essentially involves the development and management of a
portfolio of illiquid loans, with earnings arising from the difference in the interest
rate paid to depositors and that charged to borrowers, securities activities involve
the underwriting and disposal, or purchase and sale, of essentially liquid securities
through the various primary and secondary trading markets available. 47 Earnings
are generated from the difference in the price at which the security is bought
and sold, as well as through additional underwriting and other ancillary advisory
or service fees. In terms of operational risks, investment houses are subject toS41
market or position risk, that is, adverse movements in the price of the security,
which may be linked to some currency or interest rate movements, as well as
counterparty or settlement risk, where dealings are carried out on a market in
which delivery and payment operations are separated.49
In the event of a liquidity shortage, however, a securities house can either
borrow more, such as through the issuance of additional short-term subordinated
debt, although then possibly only at a higher rate, or dispose of assets. As the
assets, in this case, will largely comprise tradable securities, only limited loss
45. Subordinated debt is generally treated more favorably for capital adequacy purposes in relation
to securities business than banking business. Under modem capital requirements securitized funding
is, accordingly, cheaper than a traditional bank loan. For a critical examination of the European
developments in this area, see RICHARD DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING DEREGULATION: THE
GREAT BANKING EXPERIMENT (1992).
46. For a general discussion of the systemic issues involved with securities markets, see OECD,
SYSTEMIC RISKS IN SECURITIES MARKETS (1991). For comment, see Lichtenstein, supra note 6, at
140. See also Richard L. Fogel, Stability of Financial Markets: Federal Reserve Responsibility? in
1 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 38, ch. 15, at 317; Bevis Longstreth, Averting a Chain Reaction
Disaster in the Money World, Bus. & SocY REV., Summer 1983, at 32; Dale, supra note 44 (both
articles). In connection with clearance and settlement difficulties in securities markets, see generally
GROUP OF THIRTY (G 30), CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD'S SECURITIES
MARKETS (1989) and COMMITTEE ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS, DELIVERY VERSUS
PAYMENT IN SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS (1992). In connection with the October 1987 Crash
and the systemic issues raised in connection with the relationship between security markets and the
financial system as a whole, see STEVEN SOLOMON, THE CONFIDENCE GAME: How UNELECTED
CENTRAL BANKERS ARE GOVERNING THE CHANGED WORLD ECONOMY pt. 1 (1995).
47. In securities terms, a primary market refers to the original market of issuance or placement,
while the secondary market refers to the market on which the securities are subsequently traded.
48. Adverse currency or interest rate exposure is separately assessed for modem capital adequacy
purposes. See ALLAN MURRAY-JONES & ANDREW GAMBLE, MANAGING CAPITAL ADEQUACY: A
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS ch. 9 (1991).
49. The risk is that a counterparty may fail to deliver title or make payment on settlement of
an earlier contract. For example, dealings on the London Stock Exchange are settled after five days.
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should be incurred on their sale in contrast with the fire sale of a bank's loan
book. Even in the event of a serious shortfall, however, with the segregation of
client money and securities, the firm should be able to wind up its business
through the disposal of its whole portfolio within a short period, with losses
being limited, in the absence of fraud, and then generally borne only by the
company's shareholders.
Distinct difficulties again, however, arise with regard to insurance business.
In this case, the basic regulatory concern is not with regard to credit default by
medium- to long-term borrowers or by adverse fluctuations in market prices,
but with the long-term stability of the fund to ensure that all ongoing payment
commitments can be made.50 Although income generation is dependent on the
value of the investment portfolio, which is subject to a certain amount of market
risk, the degree of risk is less than that associated with securities businesses.
The highly regulated nature of the insurance industry, which will, in particular,
include composition rules, ensures that the bulk of the portfolio is made up of
relatively safe assets, such as local government51 or other fixed-interest debt,
which provides a more stable, but not as high yielding, return. 2
In terms of regulatory practice, insurance undertakings will also be required
to maintain a sufficient level of technical reserves to cover all outstanding under-
writing commitments, as well as separate solvency margins to cover short-term
fluctuations in asset values and trading losses. Local asset matching requirements
also may be imposed to ensure that a particular branch, or overseas operation,
has sufficient realizable assets to cover local payment demands.
The justification for the imposition of reserve and solvency requirements, in
addition to composition rules, is that insurance companies may not otherwise
hold appropriate or sufficient levels of assets to cover commitments. Although
premiums are paid in advance by policyholders, performance under the relevant
contracts will not be required until a specified future date or only in the event
that a certain stated contingency arises.
The purpose of insurance regulation is, accordingly, to protect the value of
the fund against dilution, for example, through competition in premium pricing
or the failure to maintain sufficient asset cover, so that required contractual
payments can, at all times, be made by the regulated undertaking.53
50. Difficulties may, however, arise with regards to the need to deal with the long-term informa-
tion asymmetries involved in monitoring the value of the fund and with the need to secure proper
contractual performance at the end of the investment period.
51. An important aspect of insurance and banking market regulation historically has been the
use by central banks of regulatory controls for the purpose of securing domestic monetary policy
objectives rather than for clearly established regulatory purposes. One example would be the mainte-
nance of a sound market in local government debt.
52. For a comprehensive treatment of national insurance systems and the transnational issues
that arise, see INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION (Dennis Campbell ed., 1994).
53. See generally JORG FINSINGER & MARK PAULY, THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE REGULA-
TION: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY (1986); VAUGHAN & ELLIOTT, supra note 29, ch. 10.
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In light of the very basic differences that exist between the principal financial
services markets, although securities and insurance markets are subject to signifi-
cant but distinct operational risks, they are not inherently subject to the same
dangers of systemic collapse, as banking markets, due to the absence of maturity
mismatches. The serious danger that remains with regard to the use of conglomer-
ate forms of business, however, is that trading losses incurred on securities
markets may be more easily transferred to the banking markets, with the signifi-
cant destabilizing effects which that could have on national and international
markets generally. 4 Substantial securities losses could, in particular, arise from
trading on more speculative or volatile foreign currency and derivatives markets.
The danger of loss transfer may be particularly acute where bank deposits
have been used to support securities losses for a period before the collapse, as
in the case of Barings,56 or where the availability of public support for the banking
operations has created serious moral hazard difficulties in the management of
the securities business.
A similar difficulty may, of course, also arise where losses are transferred to
the insurance markets, which may have a detrimental effect on the solvency
of a particular fund or funds, and consequential long-term social and welfare
damage.
V. Structural Regulation
One solution to the difficulties created by the risk of loss transfer between
separate financial markets is through the use of separation rules or structural
regulation at the authorization stage. In terms of separation options, the most
extreme form of regulation available is the Glass-Steagall model, as originally
developed in the United Statess7 and subsequently introduced into Japan.5 ' This
54. See supra note 38.
55. In connection with the regulatory difficulties which arise with regard to modem derivatives
trading, see generally BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (BASLE COMMITTEE), THE
MANAGEMENT OF BANKS' OFF-BALANCE SHEET EXPOSURE: A SUPERVISORY PERSPECTIVE (1986);
BIS, RECENT INNOVATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING (1986) ("the Cross Report"); BIS, RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL INTERBANK RELATIONS (1992) ("the Promisel Report"); G
30, REPORT ON DERIVATIVES (1993); BANK OF ENGLAND, DERIVATIVES: REPORT OF AN INTERNAL
WORKING GROUP (1993); BASLE COMMITTEE, PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION OF BANKS' DERIVATIVES
ACTIVITIES (1994); BASLE COMMITTEE & TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION
OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS [IOSCO], FRAMEWORK FOR SUPERVISORY INFORMATION ABOUT THE
DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS AND SECURITIES FIRMS (1995). The Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision was formerly known as the Basle Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory
Practice or, more informally, "the Cooke Committee," after its then chairman.
56. Regarding the collapse of Barings, see BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 4.
57. For a critical analysis of the effectiveness of the Glass-Steagall system, see DALE, supra
note 45.
58. See generally MAXMILLIAN J.B. HALL, BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY OF THE UK, USA AND JAPAN (1993); Richard Dale, Japan's "Glass-Steagall"
Act, 3 J. INT'L BANKING L. 138, 138-46 (1987).
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involves prohibiting banks from undertaking securities business, or owning secu-
rities firms. Intermediate options include the use of financial holding companies
or separately capitalized securities subsidiaries with appropriate financial fire-
walls to prevent risk transfer. 9
At the other regulatory extreme is the universal banking model, which allows
banks to engage fully in banking and securities activities.6 To deal with the
additional financial exposure created, capital adjustment mechanisms can be used
to ensure that sufficient capital is available to cover all of the risks involved. In
this case, however, the capital mechanisms act by way of loss absorption rather
than through the restriction on loss transfer.
In Europe, risk separation between commercial and investment banking is dealt
with by distinguishing a bank's loan book from its securities or trading book,
in connection with which separate capital requirements are imposed. 6' This is
extended to the group level by the requirement that consolidated accounts be
prepared for all banking and investment groups with further capital adjustments
being imposed to prevent abuse, such as through deduction of interests in other
financial companies in the calculation of adequate own funds, which serves, in
particular, to prevent double-gearing.62
With regards to the insurance industry, structural regulation is also generally
imposed on insurance companies at the authorization stage to prohibit them from
undertaking any other substantial types of business, although this may not be
extended to include restrictions on controlling interests or subsidiary operations.
One example of structural regulation in the insurance industry is the prohibition
on composite insurance, which involves the provision of life and nonlife coverage
by the same company, although any difficulties which may arise can be dealt
with through the maintenance of separate accounts and solvency margins. 63 An-
other more specific example is the restriction of cumul, which arises when an
insurer can cover a particular risk either through a place of establishment in a
particular country, or on a cross-border basis, from another territory.
4
In light of the different approaches adopted with regards to structural regulation
and of the distinct treatment of risk in each of the separate financial markets
involved, considerable difficulties will arise in attempting to develop common
rules, or guidelines, for the supervision of financial conglomerates at the interna-
tional level. Each distinct set of national law and supporting regulatory practice
59. See supra notes 21, 22.
60. See supra part II.
61. See the Capital Adequacy Directive, infra note 169.
62. See the Own Funds Directive, infra note 166.
63. In Europe the establishment of new composites was prohibited under the early life insurance
directives, although these restrictions were subsequently removed following an investigation by the
European Commission into the relative performance of composite insurers and those providing only
life business. See NICHOLAS PAUL & RICHARD CROLY, EC INSURANCE LAW para. 7.19 (1991).
64. See id. paras. 4.19-.22.
VOL. 30, NO. 1
LAW OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES 71
will have to be examined in an attempt to arrive at common agreement on the
relevant requirements.
Where it is not possible to agree on a particular set of provisions on specific
matters in light of the basic differences which arise with regard to market structure
and national practice, a mixture of harmonized rules and supervisory or regulatory
options will have to be developed which are capable of general acceptance and
which can secure a sufficient degree of equivalence in terms of risk identification
and protection.
The most important international and European developments in this area are
reviewed in the following sections.
VI. International Regulatory Responses
The main work produced, to date, concerning the development of global re-
sponses to the difficulties created by the supervision and regulation of financial
conglomerates has been undertaken by the Basle Committee
65 and IOSCO. 66
Although the Basle Committee has been developing general principles for
the supervision of international financial institutions and financial groups on a
consolidated basis,67 and convergence standards in respect of bank capital,6 s since
its establishment in 1974, the Committee has also become concerned more re-
cently with the specific difficulties created by the development of financial and
mixed-activity conglomerates.69 In light of the special difficulties which arise,
65. See supra note 55. See generally C.J. Thompson, The Basle Concordat: International Collab-
oration in Banking Supervision, in 1 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 38, ch. 16, at 331; Charles
Freeland, The Work of the Basle Committee, in CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 38, ch. 19, at
231.
66. See supra note 55; IOSCO, PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMER-
ATES (Dec. 7, 1992). This Report was presented at the 17th Annual Conference in London in October
1992.
67. The Basle Committee's early recommendations with regard to the development of effective
supervisory techniques in connection with the overseas activities of international banks and, in particu-
lar, with the allocation of appropriate supervisory responsibilities were set out in the 1975 First
Concordat. See BASLE COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS ON THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS'
FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS (1975). A revised Concordat was subsequently issued in 1983 following
an earlier paper in October 1978 recommending that supervision be conducted on the basis of the
consolidated balance sheet of all an international bank's constituent entities. See BASLE COMMITTEE,
REVISED BASLE CONCORDAT ON PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS' FOREIGN ESTABLISH-
MENTS (1983); BASLE COMMITTEE, CONSOLIDATION OFBANKS' BALANCE SHEETS: AGGREGATION OF
RISK-BEARING ASSETS AS A METHOD OF SUPERVISORY BANK SOLVENCY (Oct. 1978). A supplement to
the revised Concordat was issued in 1990. See BASLE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKING SUPERVISION (1990). This supplement was followed by a restatement of
the Minimum Standards for Supervision in 1992. See BASLE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKING SUPERVISION ch. VI (1992) [hereinafter 1992 REPORT]. A collection
of confidential responses from national supervisors to questionnaires issued by the Committee was
also prepared in 1984, although this was not subsequently made available to the general public.
68. BASLE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL, MEASURE-
MENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988).
69. See infra part VI.B.
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the Basle Committee established a multidisciplinary working group, made up of
regulators from each of the three principal supervisory areas involved, to examine
the feasibility of developing general principles for the supervision of financial
conglomerates. 70 This working group subsequently became known as the Tripar-
tite Group of Banking, Insurance and Securities Regulators.7'
In connection with this work, the Basle Committee set out a series of general
principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates for examination by the
Tripartite Group, which principles were reprinted in the Committee's 1992 Report
on International Developments in Banking Supervision.72 The Tripartite Group
subsequently issued a progress report in 199473 with a final report being published
in July 1995. 74
One month after the Basle Committee published its general principles in Sep-
tember 1992, IOSCO issued its Report on the Supervision of Conglomerates.75
The principal conclusions and recommendations of each of these reports are
outlined below. This is followed by a review of the recent measures proposed
in Europe to deal with the difficulties identified.
A. BASLE COMMITTEE-MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE SUPERVISION OF
INTERNATIONAL BANKING GROUPS, SEPTEMBER 1992
The basic rules with regard to the supervision of international banks and interna-
tional banking groups, which include the component parts of any financial or
mixed conglomerate, are presently set out in the Basle Minimum Standards for
the Supervision of International Banking Groups and their Cross-Border Estab-
lishments.76
The Minimum Standards followed a review of international supervisory
coordination undertaken in the summer of 1992 following, in particular, the
collapse of BCC17  and such other developments as the events that occurred
in the Atlanta branch of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro.7 8 Although the Com-
mittee concluded that the revised 1983 Concordat,7 9 and the 1990 Supple-
70. Although the work was to be carried out by the special multidisciplinary working group set
up by the Basle Committee, the group would have access to the work being carried out on the subject
by such other international institutions as IOSCO and in the European Community. 1992 REPORT,
supra note 67, at 59.
71. See infra parts VI.D. and VI.E.
72. 1992 REPORT, supra note 67, ch. III.
73. See infra part VI.D. The interim Report is reprinted in 1992 REPORT, supra note 67, ch.
VII.
74. See infra Part VI.E.
75. IOSCO, supra note 66; see infra part VI.C.
76. BASLE COMMITTEE, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL
BANKING GROUPS AND THEIR CROSS-BORDER ESTABLISHMENTS (1992), reprinted in 1992 REPORT,
supra note 67, ch. III.
77. See supra note 67; see also supra note 4.
78. 1992 REPORT, supra note 67, at 10.
79. See id.
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ment,s° were soundly based, it was concerned that supervisory authorities had
to strengthen their commitment to implement the best-efforts character of the
principles established.8
Accordingly, the Committee recommended that certain minimum standards
for supervision be established and that all Group of Ten authorities should be
expected to observe them and, at the same time, urge other supervisory authorities
throughout the world to adhere to the new minimum standards.
The Minimum Standards established are as follows:82
(1) all international banking groups and international banks should be super-
vised by a home-country authority that capably performs consolidated
supervision;
(2) the creation of a cross-border banking establishment should receive the
prior consent of both the host-country supervisory authority and the super-
visory authority of the bank and, if different, the banking group's home-
country supervisory authority;
(3) supervisory authorities should possess the right to gather information from
the cross-border banking establishments of the banks, or banking groups,
for which they are the home-country supervisor; and
(4) if a host-country authority should determine that any one of the foregoing
minimum standards is not being met to its satisfaction, that authority should
impose restrictive measures necessary to satisfy its prudential concerns consis-
tent with these minimum standards, including, if necessary, prohibition of
the creation of banking establishments in the particular territory concerned.
These Minimum Standards, with the minimum capital requirements set out in
the Basle Capital Accord,83 as amended with regards to bilateral netting and
country transfer risks and market risk,"4 constitute the basic rules presently appli-
cable to the supervision of the banking components of any national or international
business conglomerates.
B. BASLE COMMITTEE-PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL
CONGLOMERATES, SEPTEMBER 1992
General principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates were set out
in the 1992 Report on International Banking Supervision (1992 Report). The
stated purpose was to establish certain principles which the main supervisors of
financial institutions in the Group of Ten countries believed should govern the
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. The detailed requirements involved with each of the minimum standards are expanded in
the text. See id. at 11-18.
83. BASLE COMMITTEE, supra note 68. For a recent note of the amendments to be made to the
original capital accord, see BASLE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN
BANKING SUPERVISION chs. VIII, IX (1994) [hereinafter 1994 REPORT].
84. See id. ch. VIII.
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supervision of international groups which included business activities subject to
more than one supervisory authority, with the specific emphasis of the paper
being the prudential conduct and soundness of such groups.85
Although the principles developed were not necessarily to be given specific
legal or regulatory effect in the countries involved, they were recommended as
principles of general practice which authorities should follow to the extent that
they were able. Where this was not possible, authorities were expected to modify
their arrangements to enable adherence with the relevant principles. Where situa-
tions arose not covered by the principles stated in the paper, the authorities
concerned were required to consult with each other to agree on a basis to secure
the adequate supervision of the institutions involved.
8 6
The principles were generally concerned with financial conglomerates, al-
though it is stated that they could equally be applied to the supervision of mixed
conglomerates comprising any group of companies whose activities largely con-
sisted of providing financial services in different sectors, but which may also
have some commercial or industrial interests.
Although the principles were designed to deal with the difficulties created by
groups subject to supervision in more than one country, the principles were
equally applicable to groups carrying on business in a single state.
The 1992 Report lists a number of specific difficulties which arise in connection
with the supervision of financial conglomerates and sets out a corresponding set
of general principles of supervision with some additional notes on the methods
of supervision.
1. Conglomerate Supervision Difficulties
Although the advantages of asset, risk, and sources of earnings diversification
in conglomerate structures are recognized, it is noted that a number of additional
supervisory difficulties may arise with regard to contagion, double-gearing, risk
mixing, intragroup exposures, conflicts of interest, management authority, disper-
sion of control, and transparency. 7 Each of these issues is discussed in turn below.
a. Contagion
Capital shortages and confidence damage may be caused in parts of the group
through activities of supervised or unsupervised entities in other parts.
b. Double-Gearing
The sum of the regulated component capital requirements may not be covered
by the total group capital through double-gearing while capital weaknesses may
be created through quality dilution, for example, the downstreaming of subordi-
nated debt through equity participations.
85. Id. at 59.
86. id. at 60.
87. Id. at 61-63.
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c. Risk Mixing
Management and control procedures may be of insufficient quality to meet
the demands of the more complex risk management necessary to obtain the advan-
tages of the services synergy available with the conglomerate structure. Manage-
ment weaknesses may, in particular, result in the continuation of losses in one
part of the group being subsidized by profits elsewhere.
d. Intra-Group Exposures
Contagion difficulties are significantly exacerbated through complex intra-
group exposures. Such exposures may create a web of direct and indirect claims
through credit lines, equity investments, trading exposures, liquidity manage-
ment, guarantees, and commodities.
e. Conflicts of Interest
Serious conflicts of interest may arise when a banking group acts for customers
in different capacities through the provision of a range of different services, and
where substantial investors in the group, or its affiliates, are also customers of
the group in one capacity or another. Although the difficulties created can be
dealt with by Chinese Walls, it is noted that these may not prevent the reputation
of the group as a whole suffering damage and may break down if put under
pressure.
f. Management Authority
Although the benefits of conglomeration require central management, supervi-
sors of the component parts of the operation must be satisfied that adequate
management is exercised at the regulated level.
g. Dispersion of Control
Loosely structured conglomerates may result in the decentralization of control,
which obstructs effective supervision as well as possibly accentuating conflict-of-
interest problems.
h. Transparency
Conglomerate structures must be transparent to ensure that the totality of risk
involved can be properly assessed, although increasing difficulties arise through
the separation of the legal structure from the business structure for tax and regula-
tory purposes.
2. Principles of Supervision
Although it is noted that the structures of financial conglomerates are extremely
varied and continuously changing, certain general principles can be developed
for application in each individual case."8
88. Id. at 63-67.
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a. Ambit of Supervision
In situations in which the conglomerate is headed by a supervised institution,
or a financial holding company on the U.S. bank holding company model, supervi-
sion should be carried out on a group-wide basis from the top down. Where the
parent company is not supervised, any parallel financial companies must be treated
on a group-wide basis, with the supervisor always ensuring that all risks are
adequately assessed.
Where a group includes substantial nonfinancial activities, supervisors should
ensure an extra measure of prudence within the supervised institutions. If these
interests are material, however, it is recognized that supervisors can do little to
prevent the possible risk of contagion.8
b. Information and Consolidation
Supervisors should have access to information about the complete range of
risks carried on by each of the financial components in the group. Although this
information is most easily available from the parent holding company, if access
to the parent company is not possible, the information must be obtained from
the supervised entity.
Some form of consolidated supervision should be effected by the supervisor
responsible for the parent company or the major operating entity, although a
more qualitative assessment of the group should be effected beyond a simple
accounting consolidation, which may distort the true level of risk present due
to the different accounting principles applicable to the separate activities involved.
As the distinctions between different types of financial intermediation break down,
a more qualitatively based assessment is necessary to ensure that all risks present
in the group are taken into account.
c. Capital Strength
The capital base of the parent company within a group should be at least as
large as the sum of the capital required by the supervisors and regulators of each
of the operating companies involved together with the capital employed in any
unregulated subsidiaries in cases both where the parent is a substantial financial
institution and where the parent is only a holding company with the operations
of the group being undertaken through subsidiaries.
The quality of the parent company's capital should also be as good, or better,
than that of each of the operating companies, although some minor dilution may
be acceptable provided that it is only equal to a small proportion of total group
capital.
Capital must also be well distributed within the group, with each operating
89. Problems arise with regard to mixed-activity groups as only authorized institutions can be
supervised and sanctioned, while any attempt by supervisors to exercise any authority over the
nonfinancial element creates the risk of moral hazard to the extent that the public may assume that
the whole group is then subject to complete supervision.
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company being adequately capitalized in accordance with the relevant regulatory
provisions, although the group structure must not allow the same capital to be
used more than once. 90
d. Organization
The structure of the conglomerate must be coherent and transparent to supervi-
sors and regulators, as well as to creditors and other customers, with supervisors
having powers to prohibit obstructive corporate structures and to direct the loca-
tion of the place of business of the parent company and principal operating subsidi-
aries.
If the conglomerate includes commercial, industrial, or other activities unre-
lated to the supervised activity, it is recommended that the financial activities
be placed in a self-contained subgroup to facilitate supervision on a consolidated
basis.
e. Ownership
The fitness and properness of shareholders should be vetted to prevent conflicts
from arising between the interests of shareholders and other creditors such as
investors, depositors, and policyholders. While shareholders will be concerned
with ensuring that their capital is properly rewarded, they must also act responsi-
bly with regard to other group creditors.
f. Risk Control
Adequate control mechanisms must be in place throughout the group, and
information accurately processed in order to ensure that all group risks are prop-
erly monitored, especially with regard to large credit and market risk exposures.
Adequate arrangements must also exist to monitor and control liquidity on a
group basis.
g. Connected Transactions
Intra-group credit lines9' and other forms of connected payments, such as
abnormal service fees or dividend payments, must be carefully monitored to
ensure that regulated entities are not "milked" by nonfinancial members of the
group. Although consolidation is effective in assessing external risks, it may
conceal dangerous intra-group imbalances. Supervisors must, accordingly, care-
fully monitor unusual intra-group transactions as well as all forms of connected
lending.
90. The difficulties which arise in connection with capital adequacy in conglomerates are consid-
ered in much greater detail in the final Report of the Tripartite Group of Banking, Securities and
Insurance Regulators of July 1995. See infra part VI.E.
91. For example, a banking subsidiary may lend to a nonbank parent, or an unsupervised entity,
without complying with the normal credit assessment procedures.
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h. Management
Supervisors and regulators must make certain that regulated and nonregulated
holding companies have adequate strength of management to ensure that total
group risk is prudently managed. All managers directly or indirectly capable of
influencing the supervised components within the group must be qualified as fit
and proper and have adequate authority to respond to the demands of supervisors
acting on behalf of depositors, investors, and policyholders.
i. External Audit
While it is recognized that the appointment of a single audit firm may ensure
that an independent overall view of the group is obtained, a local auditor with
specialized knowledge of individual group activities may also have an important
role to play in the supervisory process.
3. Methods of Supervision
In a particular case, distinct methods of supervision will be adopted to give
effect to the principles set out above although these methods should normally
include each of the following components.
a. Cooperation
Authorities must cooperate to ensure the effective supervision of groups made
up of distinct entities subject to supervisors and regulators from more than one
discipline and in more than one country. For this reason, authorities must have
adequate powers to share prudential information, especially with regard to intra-
group exposures.92
b. Lead Supervisors or Regulators
Where possible, a convener should be appointed to ensure that all authorities
are properly furnished with all appropriate information. The convener should
usually be the supervisor of the dominant business within the group.
c. Individual Supervisor
It is recommended that one supervisory authority should exercise overall re-
sponsibility for the whole group. Where the parent company is a supervised
entity, the other supervisors involved may, however, not be able to surrender
their functions in all cases, and may need to retain separate responsibility in
connection with the activities of the group component within their jurisdiction.
To the extent possible, however, supervisory action should be taken in cooperation
with the other authorities involved.
92. See BASLE COMMITTEE, SUPPLEMENT TO THE BASLE CONCORDAT ON THE ENSURING OF
ADEQUATE INFORMATION FLOWS BETWEEN SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES (1990), circulated to bank-
ing, securities, and insurance supervisory authorities worldwide.
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C. IOSCO TECHNICAL COMMITTEE-PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION OF
FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES, NOVEMBER 1992
The Technical Committee of IOSCO issued its Report on the Principles for
the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates at its 17th Annual Conference in
London in October 1992. The purpose of the Technical Committee's report
was to establish general principles to form the basis for the risk assessment
of financial conglomerates which could be used, as far as possible, to guide
the development of regulatory practice and regulatory cooperation in the area.9'
The Technical Committee, however, noted that although the principles were
relevant to the question of conglomerate supervision generally, the main con-
cern of the Committee was with groups in which securities business played
a significant part.94
The Technical Committee made the following principal recommendations:
(1) risk assessment should be group-based if the regulated firm that is part
of the financial conglomerate is vulnerable to the risk of contagion; 95
(2) amounts counted towards regulatory capital should be controlled by appro-
priate regulations including, in particular, appropriate deductions to avoid
double-gearing;
96
(3) the effective risk assessment of financial conglomerates requires careful
monitoring of intra-group exposures and, where necessary, limits on such
exposures in the regulated entity;97
(4) corporate and managerial structures of the financial conglomerate should
be fully understood by the regulator;
98
(5) regulators should seek, insofar as possible, to identify shareholders with
such a stake in the conglomerate as would enable them to exert material
influence on the activities of the entity; 99
(6) appropriate regulatory standards should be established for managers of a
regulated entity;r°°
93. IOSCO, supra note 66, at 10.
94. Id. at 3.
95. Id. at 11. The effect is to support the traditional approach of securities regulators to the
prudential regulation of securities firms on a solo as opposed to consolidated basis, although this is
to be complemented through an assessment of the risk the rest of the financial conglomerate creates
for the regulated securities firm. The Introduction to the Principles notes that even where the failure
of a regulated securities firm is unlikely to have serious consequences for the securities industry and
the financial system generally, the risk of contagion means that it is highly desirable for the securities
regulator to have early warning of problems elsewhere in the group. Id. at 8. For comment on the
extent to which this supports the SEC's Temporary Risk Assessment Rules under the Market Reform
Act in place of the BHCA approach, see Lichtenstein, supra note 6, at 155.
96. IOSCO, supra note 66, at 17.
97. Id. at 20. In connection with the response of the European Community, see the Large Expo-
sures Directive, 1992 O.J. (L 29) 1.
98. IOSCO, supra note 64, at 21.
99. Id. at 22.
100. Id. at 23.
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(7) every effort should be made to promote supervisory cooperation and to
appoint a lead regulator where the activities of a group involve more than
one regulatory authority ;'0 1 and
(8) regulators should recognize the importance of the role of external auditors
and the possible contribution that they may make to group-based risk assess-
ment. 1 02
The IOSCO Principles, although more limited in scope and content than the
Basle Principles for the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, reflect the gen-
eral content of a number of the Basle proposals. It is significant, however, that
the IOSCO recommendations support the continuation of a solo rather than a
consolidated approach to supervision, which reflects the present North American
style of securities supervision. 103
D. TRIPARTITE GROUP OF BANKING, INSURANCE AND SECURITIES
REGULATORS-PROGRESS REPORT ON THE SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL
CONGLOMERATES, APRIL 1994
Following the issuance of the 1992 Basle Report, ° the Tripartite Group of
Banking, Insurance and Securities Regulators met for the first time in February
1993. '0 A progress report was produced in April 1994 and sent to the Basle
Committee, to IOSCO, and to the heads of insurance supervisory authorities in
the Group of Ten countries.' °6 A technical subgroup was also established to
examine in further detail issues related to the overall assessment of capital ade-
quacy in financial conglomerates, although the results of this examination were
not made publicly available. 0 7
In the Progress Report, the Tripartite Group made a number of recommenda-
tions with regard to supervisory approaches, cooperation, capital adequacy, struc-
ture, ownership and management, contagion, external auditors, and supervisory
arbitrage. 'O Although the Group did not wish to underestimate the difficulties
which arose with regard to financial conglomerates, especially in connection with
the more technical aspects of prudential supervision, it believed that there was
a realistic prospect for developing some form of multidisciplinary understanding
101. Id. at 24.
102. Id. at 28.
103. See infra part VI.E.2. Additional difficulties exist with regard to the inclusion of insurance
in addition to commercial and investment banking supervision in the considerations of the Tripartite
Group.
104. See supra part VI.B. and note 67.
105. The Group was chaired by Mr. Tom de Swann, executive director of De Nederlandsche
Bank. Further meetings were held in 1993, April 1994, and November 1994.
106. A copy of the Report is reprinted in 1994 REPORT, supra note 83, ch. VI.
107. The subgroup was chaired by Mr. Jonathan Spencer, head of the Insurance Division of the
Department of Trade and Industry in the United Kingdom.
108. 1994 REPORT, supra note 83, at 56-61.
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on the principles which would form the basis of future supervision of financial
conglomerates.
E. TRIPARTITE GROUP OF BANK, SECURITIES AND INSURANCE
REGULATORSI°9-REPORT ON THE SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL
CONGLOMERATES, JULY 1995
As a result of the further work undertaken by the Tripartite Group, a final
Report on the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates was published in July
1995 (1995 Report). " ° The stated purpose of the 1995 Report was to identify
problems that financial conglomerates posed for supervisors and to consider ways
in which these problems might be overcome.
The 1995 Report was, however, only issued as a discussion document in light
of the informal nature of the Tripartite Group. A more formal joint forum is to
be established by the Basle Committee, IOSCO, and the International Association
of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) to develop practical working arrangements be-
tween the different supervisors involved.1 '
The 1995 Report contains a number of detailed recommendations in connection
with capital adequacy, supervisory cooperation, group structures, contagion,
large exposures, shareholders' and managers' fitness and properness, information
access, supervisory arbitrage, and mixed conglomerates. " 2
The specific difficulties which arise with regard to capital adequacy a13 are also
considered in further detail with a number of practical examples being provided
to illustrate the recommendations made. '14 An analysis of the responses received
from members of the Tripartite Group to a questionnaire on the present arrange-
ments for the supervision of financial conglomerates in each of the countries and
regulatory areas involved is also provided.115
109. Although formerly referred to as the Tripartite Group of Banking, Insurance and Securities
Regulators, the July 1995 Report is stated to be issued by the Tripartite Group of Bank, Securities
and Insurance Regulators.
110. TRIPARTITE GROUP OF BANK, SECURITIES AND INSURANCE REGULATORS, REPORT ON THE
SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES (July 1995) [hereinafter 1995 REPORT]. Copies of
the 1995 Report were sent to the Basle Committee, the Technical Committee of IOSCO, and the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) early in 1995. Although the three groups
have not endorsed the contents of the 1995 Report, its recommendations have been accepted as a
sound basis for further collaborative efforts.
111. The new group will propose improvements in cooperation and information exchanges between
supervisors and develop principles upon which the future supervision of financial conglomerates
could be based. The new group will continue under the present chair of the Tripartite Group, Mr.
de Swann.
112. See infra part VII.H.7.
113. 1995 REPORT, supra note 110, ch. IV.
114. Id. app. III.
115. Id. app. II.
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1. Financial Conglomerates and Conglomerate Structure
In the 1995 Report, the Tripartite Group agreed that the term financial conglom-
erate would be used to refer to any group of companies under common control
whose exclusive or predominant activities consisted of providing services in at
least two different financial sectors, namely, banking, securities, or insurance. 11
6
Although it was recognized that many of the problems which arose with regard
to financial conglomerates would also affect mixed conglomerates offering nonfi-
nancial or commercial services, in addition to at least one financial service, the
primary focus of the 1995 Report would be on financial conglomerates.
2. Supervisory Issues
The 1995 Report identifies a number of specific supervisory issues in connec-
tion with which a series of supervisory recommendations are made.
a. Overall Approach to Supervision
The 1995 Report again notes that the growth of financial conglomerates makes it
essential that supervisors in the banking, securities, and insurance sectors establish
coordinated approaches to the supervision of the relevant institutions where super-
vision could not be effected on a purely solo basis. While solo supervision of
individually regulated companies should continue to be the basis of effective
supervision, a group-wide perspective had to be developed in connection with
the prudential assessment of the group as a whole to ensure that supervisors could
properly assess total group risks and the respective capital coverage as well as
limit excessive or double-gearing.' 17
b. Assessment of Capital Adequacy
Fundamental difficulties did, however, arise in connection with capital ade-
quacy determinations in light of the distinct prudential requirements applicable
to banks, insurance, and securities undertakings. It was, however, accepted that
an assessment of risk from a group perspective could be achieved by either
consolidated supervision or supervision on a solo-plus basis.
With regard to consolidated supervision, the assets and liabilities of all compa-
nies within the group would be totaled and set against the parent company's
capital. "' Solo-plus supervision would involve individual institutions being super-
vised on a solo basis according to the relevant capital requirements set by their
respective regulators. This solo supervision would, however, be complemented
by a group-wide assessment of the availability of capital, which may be achieved
through either aggregation, which involves totaling the solo capital requirements
116. The definition followed that contained in the earlier progress report; 1994 REPORT, supra
note 83, at 53.
117. 1995 REPORT, supra note 110, para. 42.
118. Due to the emphasis on the parent or holding company, consolidated supervision is sometimes
referred to as "top-down" supervision.
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of the companies within the group and comparing the result with group capital,
or risk-based deduction, which involves deducting investment by parent compa-
nies in subsidiaries and any capital shortfalls in the subsidiaries from the parent's
capital, with the result being compared with the parent's solo capital require-
ment. '19
In its earlier Progress Report, the Tripartite Group had unanimously recom-
mended that capital adequacy be assessed on a group-wide basis in order to
prevent double-gearing through the use of the same capital within separate parts
of the group for regulatory purposes. There had, however, been no agreement
on whether this assessment should be achieved on a solo-plus or consolidated
basis.12 0 Some members of the Group advocated undertaking further research to
attempt to achieve, at least, partial harmonization of relevant prudential rules to
permit consolidation of the separate financial areas involved. Other members
favored the continuation of a solo-plus approach in light of the complex and
labor-intensive nature of consolidation, its dependence upon the quality and con-
sistency of the underlying accounts, which may be inaccurate or misleading, and
the basic uncertainty that arose as to whether consolidation could satisfy all of
the distinct concerns of each of the regulators concerned. 121
In the 1995 Report, the Tripartite Group distinguished between homogeneous
and heterogeneous groups in connection with which quantitative capital assess-
ments could be made. With regard to homogeneous groups, an accounting-based
consolidation was recognized as an appropriate technique. 122 This technique in-
volves a comparison, on a single set of valuation principles, of total consolidated
group assets and liabilities, with the capital requirements at the parent company
level being applied to the consolidated figures.
A number of separate techniques were, however, examined in connection
with heterogeneous groups. While block capital adequacy, which involves the
classification and aggregation of assets and liabilities according to risk types,
could achieve an accounting-based consolidation for heterogeneous groups, this
technique depends upon the development of harmonized standards, which was
considered impracticable in the foreseeable future.' 23
119. Solo-plus supervision is also referred to as "bottom-up" supervision due the emphasis on
individual supervision.
120. Although bank regulators and securities regulators within the European Community increas-
ingly rely on consolidated supervision, with possibly no solo supervision being undertaken at all,
most insurance regulators and certain securities regulators in, for example, the United States, prefer
solo-plus supervision. This preference is due to the perceived disadvantages involved in consolidation
of additional costs, the possibility of supervisory involvement in nonfinancial activities, and the
combination of distinct balance sheets to which different prudential requirements are applied.
121. While the Tripartite Group noted that the supervisory approach adopted should be flexible,
it concluded that it was neither desirable nor possible to formulate a single supervisory technique
applicable in all circumstances with the most appropriate approach generally depending on the struc-
ture and nature of the particular conglomerate.
122. 1995 REPORT, supra note 110, para. 108.
123. Id. paras. 109, 110.
SPRING 1996
84 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Sufficient insight into the risks and capital coverage involved with heteroge-
neous groups could, however, be achieved through one of three alternative tech-
niques: a building block prudential approach, which involves the use of the consol-
idated accounts at the parent company level; 12 4 risk-based aggregation, whereby
the solo capital requirements of the regulated group are totaled and the result
compared with group capital; 125 and risk-based deduction, which involves examin-
ing each company in turn, beginning at the lowest level of the group, with subsid-
iary investments being subject to a risk deduction element, calculated on the basis
of the own funds of the subsidiary assessed on a solo-plus basis, less the capital
requirement of the subsidiary, multiplied by the proportion of shares held in the
subsidiary. '26
The Tripartite Group concluded by recommending that each of these three
techniques could form the basis of a set of minimum ground rules for the assess-
ment of capital adequacy, the use of which could be developed on a mutual
recognition basis. 2 7 A fourth total deduction approach was also noted, which
would eliminate double-gearing but not provide any group assessment of the risks
involved.
The 1995 Report concluded by noting that the type and structure of the conglom-
erate in question may determine which of the four techniques may be most appro-
priate for supervisory use. 2 8 Detailed recommendations are also provided with
regard to subsidiaries which are not wholly controlled, 2 9 provisions with regard
to suitability and availability of capital surpluses, 30 and provisions concerning
the supervision of groups that include substantial nonregulated entities. 3'
c. Contagion
Contagion was specifically recognized as one of the most important issues
facing supervisors in relation to financial conglomerates despite the advantages
that may otherwise be available in terms of greater financial capacity and wider
diversification of activities.' 32 The Tripartite Group was, however, concerned
that contagion could arise from transfer of lack of market confidence to distinct
parts of the group as well as through direct intra-group exposures. 3 3 The use
of firewalls in connection with the prevention of inter-conglomerate contagion,
124. Id. paras. 111-115.
125. Id. paras. 116-121.
126. Id. paras. 124-129.
127. Id. paras. 122, 123.
128. Id. paras. 130, 131.
129. Id. paras. 132-153.
130. Id. paras. 154-159.
131. Id. paras. 160-171.
132. Id. para. 48.
133. Id. paras. 49, 50.
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through restrictions on intra-group transfers, which would otherwise breach indi-
vidual company capital requirements, was also discussed.'
4
Although it was accepted that the provisions applicable to U.S. securities firms
have been successful in the past, it was noted that these firms were less likely
to fail due to the highly liquid nature of their balance sheets and the lack of any
predisposition to support other companies within the group. 135 Banking groups,
in contrast, were very sensitive to market funding and were consequently more
prepared to prevent failure within the group.
d. Intra-group Exposures
It was recognized that specific difficulties arose with regard to intra-group
exposures due to their exclusion from a consolidated balance sheet as a result
of netting and due to the non-arm's-length nature of the transaction. 36 To deal
with these difficulties, the Tripartite Group recommended solo supervision, at
both the subsidiary and parent company levels, with appropriate reporting obliga-
tions, 137 liaison between relevant supervisors, and regulatory discretion to prohibit
exposures where necessary.13
8
Supervisors should also monitor the extent to which supervised institutions
within a conglomerate may be exposed to funding or trading difficulties arising
as a result of shifts in market confidence.
The Tripartite Group recommended that regulators be made aware in specific
terms of the purpose of any intra-group exposures, whether of a long- or short-
term nature, and whether they were self-liquidating or likely to be repeated
or rolled over. 3 9 In such circumstances, regulators must ensure that capital is
increased, or activities limited, to ensure that no unacceptable intra-group expo-
sures arise.
Some members of the Group recommended the introduction of predetermined
limits on intra-group exposures to individual companies on an aggregate basis
and, possibly, the imposition of reporting obligations where intra-group exposures
exceeded a certain level.
e. Large Exposures at Group Level
The distinct approaches applicable to banking and insurance regulation in con-
nection with large exposures were noted.
134. Id. para. 51.
135. See supra part IV.
136. 1995 REPORT, supra note 110, para. 56.
137. The relevant data may include: gross commitments; amount, nature, and residual maturity
of commitments; profits and losses associated with intra-group transactions; and confirmation that
business is being conducted on market terms and conditions. Id. para. 57.
138. Id. para. 63.
139. These exposures may arise from direct credit lines or from intra-group cross-shareholdings,
trading operations, central short-term liquidity management, guarantees and commitments, and ser-
vices provisions such as pension arrangements.
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Although credit institutions were typically subject to specific limits on solo
and consolidated exposures, insurance undertakings generally had to comply with
asset diversification rules or risk-based capital incentives directed towards asset
diversification. 140 The wide differences which existed, however, created consider-
able scope for regulatory arbitrage to such an extent that it was recognized that
the gaps which existed would not be corrected within the foreseeable future. 14'
It was, however, agreed that a combination of large exposures to the same
counterparty by different parts of the group could cause considerable difficulties
to the stability of the group as a whole and, for this reason, a group-wide assess-
ment had to be adopted. One solution was through the introduction of reporting
obligations to the parent, or lead regulator, to ensure that they were able to assess
significant group exposures to individual counterparties.
f. Conflicts of Interest
Specific conflicts of interest could arise when banking or insurance units within
the conglomerate made loans or invested assets within the group outside usual
approval processes or where investors, with substantial holdings in the conglomer-
ate, had separate contractual relationships with businesses within the group which
created shareholder and creditor conflicts. 1
42
Although the 1995 Report makes no specific recommendations in these regards,
the general recommendations concerning management and shareholder controls
within conglomerates and, in particular, management autonomy and suitability
of shareholders, should assist to avoid dangerous conflicts of interest arising. 1
43
g. Fit and Proper Tests for Managers
Although supervisors generally had sufficient powers to confirm the suitability
of managers of regulated firms, managers from other companies within the con-
glomerate and, in particular, from upstream entities, were not subject to any
controls.'" Where control may be exercised, directly or indirectly, by such man-
agers, supervisors should have extended powers of approval or review. 1
45
h. Transparency of Legal and Managerial Structures
Supervisors and regulators must be able to refuse to grant, or to withdraw,
authorization in circumstances where conglomerate structures are not sufficiently
transparent and conducive to group supervision.'"
Supervisors and regulators should be aware of the legal and managerial struc-
ture of the conglomerate and be satisfied that all regulatory activities undertaken
140. 1995 REPORT, supra note 110, para. 64.
141. Id. para. 18.
142. Id. paras. 73, 74.
143. See infra parts VI.E.2.i. and j.
144. 1995 REPORT, supra note 110, para. 75.
145. Id. para. 76.
146. Id. para. 77.
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within the group are supervised by a supervisor who can be relied upon to do
so effectively and to provide the information necessary for group risk assessments.
In connection with this supervision, the lines of accountability within a conglomer-
ate and the form the accountability takes must be clear. This may involve the
use of up-to-date organizational charts and information about ownership and
managerial structures.
147
In connection with large international financial conglomerates, the Tripartite
Group insisted that supervisors had adequate powers, both before and after autho-
rization, to obtain adequate information regarding corporate structures and to
prohibit structures that impaired adequate supervision. 
48
i. Management Autonomy
One specific difficulty identified in connection with management structures
was the sufficiency of independence and authority of the management of the
regulated entity. To guarantee that conflicts did not arise between supervisory
and group management requirements, it was necessary to ensure sufficient man-
agement autonomy in the regulated entity. For this purpose, supervisors had to
know who was responsible for compliance with legal and supervisory require-
ments and be informed of any significant changes in shareholders of the regulated
entity as well as significant management changes within the group. 1
49
j. Suitability of Shareholders
A shareholder who exerted any material influence on a regulated firm should
be subject to applicable fitness standards, both upon authorization and subse-
quently, with supervisors having adequate powers to intervene as necessary.
Supervisory intervention will, for example, include powers of disinvestment and
removal or restriction of voting rights, although it was recognized that intervention
might not be possible where 100 percent or majority shareholders were in-
volved. 50
k. Rights of Access to Prudential Information
To ensure that separate regulators in one country and in overseas countries
cooperate sufficiently to achieve the effective supervision of financial conglomer-
ates, the Group made the following recommendations: 5 ' supervisory authorities
must have sufficient legal powers to share prudential information with each other,
including information on intra-group exposures subject to professional secrecy
requirements; supervisors must actively exchange information, both nationally
147. Id. para. 78.
148. Id. para. 79. In connection with supervisors' powers, the 1992 Basle Banking Supervision
Committee's minimum standards were recommended. See 1992 REPORT, supra note 67. The proposals
put forward by the European Community were also noted. See infra part VII.
149. 1995 REPORT, supra note 110, para. 80.
150. Id. para. 81.
151. Id. para. 85.
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and internationally, either within a single category or between distinct categories
of supervisors; and supervisors must be able to obtain and share with other
supervisors prudential information on nonregulated entities within the conglomer-
ate to the extent that the information may be relevant for supervisory purposes.
The Tripartite Group again recommended that the supervisors and regulators
of the various component parts of a group should appoint the supervisor of a
dominant business in the group to act as convener whenever possible. 5 The
convener should then be responsible for ensuring that all authorities involved
were supplied with all necessary information, subject to public and professional
secrecy requirements, and for the coordination of the risk assessment determina-
tion for the group as a whole. The convener should also be responsible for the
coordination of any necessary supervisory action, especially in circumstances
where two or more authorities act simultaneously. 53
In the 1995 Report, the use of memoranda of understanding or protocols are
recommended despite some disagreement on the benefits of such agreements in
terms of the cost and time burden involved in negotiating them, especially with
regard to information exchanges in the absence of any clear cause for regulatory
concern. The matter was left for determination by the particular supervisors
involved. 
1 54
Although the development of cross-sectoral meetings in each country was con-
sidered, the difficulties in organizing such meetings on an international scale were
recognized. Again, no specific recommendations were made in this regard. 5
Where external auditors had concerns about the financial and operational condi-
tion of a regulated entity, or the group to which the entity belonged, they should be
required to report their concerns to the relevant supervisors. Any confidentiality
problems that could arise in connection with these reporting obligations should
be corrected through appropriate legislation.1
56
In connection with the external audit of the conglomerate as a whole, the
Tripartite Group recommended that the principle of appointing one firm to provide
an overall assessment of the group should be considered further, notwithstanding
the existing appointment of distinct auditors to different parts of the group. 157
1. Supervisory Arbitrage
While the scope for supervisory arbitrage in relation to core activities is limited
in most jurisdictions, it was recognized that the residual possibility of arbitrage
should be prevented. This could be achieved by ensuring that the same types of
152. Id. para. 86.
153. Id. para. 87.
154. Id. paras. 88, 89.
155. Id. paras. 90, 91.
156. Id. para. 92.
157. Id. para. 93.
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risk undertaken within certain parts of the group are covered by identical amounts
and structures of capital, irrespective of location and according to the "same-
business, same-risk, same-rule principle," although this would require detailed
harmonization of banking, securities, and insurance regulations.
In light of the unrealistic nature of this approach, the Tripartite Group recom-
mended the adoption of a more pragmatic, but limited, arrangement involving
an early warning system whereby supervisors would be required to report to
each other on the establishment of conglomerate entities within their jurisdiction
and on the transfer of assets, liabilities, or contingent liabilities between different
parts of the group. This should enable supervisors to identify possible instances
of arbitrage and take appropriate remedial action at an early stage.
m. Moral Hazard
Although the issue of moral hazard had not been considered in any detail in the
April 1994 Progress Report, in the 1995 Report, the Tripartite Group expressed
concern that supervisors may create the impression that unregulated parts of a
group are regulated or supervised, even if only informally, as a result of informa-
tion requests. No specific recommendations are, however, made in this regard. 158
n. Mixed Conglomerates
In connection with mixed conglomerates, the Tripartite Group was concerned
about the additional difficulties which arose with regard to capital assessments
since supervisory practices could not be extended to apply to substantial nonfinan-
cial entities. The Group, accordingly, recommended the use of some form of
ring-fencing, the simplest form being the use of an intermediate holding company
to create a subfinancial group within the conglomerate.' 59
Further recommendations are also made with regard to management quality,
experience, and independence in mixed groups to avoid additional contagion
difficulties and information requests in connection with other group activity which
might adversely affect the regulated entity.160
3. Conclusions
The 1995 Report concludes by noting the importance of the need for more inten-
sive cooperation between supervisors in the distinct fields of financial supervision
involved and for further work to be undertaken in connection with the identification
of impediments to the exchange of appropriate information between regulators. '
6
Agreement was, however, possible on broad areas of approach which involved the
158. Id. para. 96.
159. Id. para. 100.
160. Id. paras. 101-103.
161. Id. para. 175.
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development of general group-wide supervisory practices, although this was to be
without replacing the solo supervision of individual group entities. 62
Despite the difficulties which arose with regards to the different definitions
of capital, types of risk, and capital requirements, considerable progress was
made in identifying acceptable techniques for the assessment of capital adequacy
in the 1995 Report. The Tripartite Group hoped that its efforts over the last two
years would provide a firm foundation for further work to be undertaken in this
area.
VII. The European Response
Despite the recent adoption and implementation within the European Commu-
nity 163 of each of the principal directives in the banking, securities, and insurance
sectors, as well as in connection with the free movement of capital,'64 the Commu-
162. Id. para. 176.
163. Under art. G.A(1) of the Maastrict Treaty, all references in the Treaty of Rome to the European
Economic Treaty are to be replaced by references to the European Community. The European Union
is created under art. A of the Maastrict Treaty with additional powers being conferred on it in respect
of Common Foreign and Security Policy (art. J) and Home Affairs and Justice Policy (art. K). The
Union is, however, expressly stated to be founded on the European Communities, that is, the European
Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community
(art. A, para. 3). The basic provisions concerning European banking and financial services remain
within the renamed European Community Treaty, as amended by the Treaty Amending Certain Finan-
cial Provisions, the Single European Act, the Merger Treaty, the Greenland Treaty, the Acts of Acces-
sion, and the Maastrict Treaty. References in this article are, accordingly, to the European Community
and not to the European Union. See Treaty on European Union, 1992 O.J. (C 191).
164. The adoption and implementation dates for the principal directives in the European Commu-
nity financial law program are indicated below (Official Journal references not included here are





Coordination Directive 77/780 12/12/77 12/12/79
Own Funds Directive 89/299 4/17/87 1/1/93
Second Banking
Co-ordination Directive 89/646 12/15/89 1/1/93




Directive 92/121 12/21/92 1/1/94
Prudential Supervision
Directive 95/26 5/18/95 11/18/95
2. Securities
Investment Services
Directive 93/22 5/10/93 7/1/96
Capital Adequacy
Directive 93/6 3/15/93 7/1/96
Prudential Supervision
Directive 95/26 5/18/95 11/18/95
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nity has not yet been able to develop a complete response to the regulatory
difficulties created by the growth of financial and mixed conglomerates. The
Community is, however, considering the introduction of common minimum stan-
dards for the prudential supervision of financial conglomerates following the
establishment of a working group in 1994 which reported its conclusions to the
European Commission in the summer of 1995. As a result of these findings,
the Commission will prepare a report which will be sent to Member States for
consultation, following which a draft directive will be produced (the proposed
Conglomerate Supervision Directive).
A considerable amount of progress has been possible within the Community
with regard to the development of appropriate controls for the authorization and
regulation of credit institutions and investment firms under the First 65 and Second
Banking Directives166 and the Investment Services Directive.167 The supervision
of financial groups, which comprise banking or investment subsidiaries, has also





Directive 92/49 6/18/92 7/21/94
Third Life Insurance
Directive 92/96 11/10/92 7/21/94
Prudential Supervision
Directive 95/26 5/18/95 11/18/95
4. Capital
Free Movement of Capital
Directive 88/361 6/24/88 7/1/90
165. First Council Directive 77/780 of Dec. 12, 1977, on the Co-ordination of Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit
Institutions, 1977 O.J. (L 322) 30.
166. Second Council Directive 89/646 of December 15, 1989, on the Co-ordination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business
of Credit Institutions, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1. The Second Banking Directive is supplemented by the
Own Funds and Solvency Ratio Directives, which introduce a common definition of capital for credit
institutions and a minimum risk-weighted solvency requirement of 8%. See Council Directive 89/
299 of Apr. 17, 1989, on the Own Funds of Credit Institutions, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 16, as amended
by Council Directive 91/633, 1991 O.J. (L 339) 33 & Council Directive 92/16, 1992 O.J. (L 75)
48; Council Directive 89/647 of Dec. 18, 1989, on a Solvency Ratio for Credit Institutions, 1989
O.J. (L 386) 14, as amended by Council Directive 91/31, 1991 O.J. (L 17) 20. Concentration limits
for credit institutions were subsequently introduced under Council Directive 92/121 of Dec. 21,
1992, on the Monitoring and Control of Large Exposures of Credit Institutions, 1992 O.J. (L 29)
1, following the earlier Commission Recommendation 87/62, 1987 O.J. (L 33) 10.
167. Council Directive 93/22 of May 10, 1993, on Investment Services in the Securities Field,
1993 O.J. (L 141) 27.
168. Council Directive 92/350 of Apr. 6, 1992, on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on
a Consolidated Basis, 1992 O.J. (L 110) 52. Under Directive 92/350, consolidated supervision
was extended to apply to groups headed by a financial holding company. Id. art. 3(2). A financial
holding company is a financial institution, the subsidiary undertakings of which are either exclu-
sively, or mainly, credit or financial institutions, with at least one subsidiary being a credit
institution. Id. art. 1.
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Capital Adequacy Directive. 69 Similar progress with regards to insurance under-
takings has, however, been impossible.
Although all of the principal directives were further amended by the Prudential
Supervision Directive, which was finally adopted on May 18, 1995,170 this made
no attempt to integrate the three sectors. The Directive was adopted in response
to the collapse of BCCI and only strengthened the powers of authorities with
regard to refusal of authorization where a group structure was not sufficiently
transparent, with the additional requirement that financial institutions maintain
their head and registered offices in the same Member State. The Directive only
otherwise introduced additional exchange of information provisions and reporting
obligations for external auditors. 171
In light of the very distinct requirements applicable to the regulation of insur-
ance markets and the general difficulty in agreeing on common standards between
all of the Member States of the European Community in this area, insurance
undertakings have until now only been covered by separate insurance-specific
measures and, even then, only on an individual, and not a group, basis.
172
Over the last two years, the Commission has attempted to secure agreement
on a set of common provisions for insurance groups, especially with regards to
the supervision of intra-group exposures and the prevention of double-gearing
(under a proposed Insurance Group Directive).173 Instead of imposing consoli-
169. Council Directive 93/6 of Mar. 15, 1993, on the Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms
and Credit Institutions, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 1. When a group of financial companies does not include
a credit institution, the definition of a financial holding company in the Consolidated Supervision
Directive is amended to include any financial institution the subsidiaries of which are either exclusively
or mainly investment firms or other financial institutions, at least one of which is an investment
firm. Id. art. 7(3). Under art. 7(2), the capital adequacy and large exposures requirements imposed
by arts. 4 and 5 of the directive are to be applied on a consolidated basis.
170. The adoption of the directive had been considerably delayed as a result of the new conciliation
decision-making procedure introduced under the Maastrict Treaty: art. G(61) adding a new art.
189b to the European Community Treaty. Although the procedure was intended to improve the
decision-making processes within the Community by making them more democratic, through the
introduction of further cooperation with the European Parliament, the effect can be substantially to
complicate and slow down the adoption process.
171. See COM(94) final-COD468, Brussels, May 2, 1994; COM(93)363 final-SYN468, Brussels,
July 28, 1993.
172. See CLIFFORD CHANCE, INSURANCE REGULATION IN EUROPE (1993); R. Falkner, Insurance,
in FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE NEW EUROPE (D. Campbell ed., 1992); D. Perry, Insurance Regulation:
Past, Present and Future, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF FINANCIAL SERVICES (Edward J.
Swann ed., 1993); PAUL & CROLY, supra note 63. Three generations of measures have been adopted
in the insurance area within the Community. These measures generally have extended the basic rights
of an establishment that initially operated on a host country control basis to include services on a home
basis and ultimately to establish services on a home basis with respect to both nonlife and life business:
First Non-Life Directive 73/239 of July 24, 1973, O.J. (L 228) 3; First Life Directive 79/267 of Mar.
5, 1979, O.J. (L 63) 1; Second Non-Life Directive 88/357 of June 22, 1988, O.J. (L 172) 1; Second
Life Directive 90/619 of Nov. 8, 1990, O.J. (L 330) 50; Third Non-Life Directive 92/49 of 18 June
1992, O.J. (L 228) 1; Third Life Directive 92/96 of Nov. 10, 1992, O.J. (L 360) 1.
173. See EUR. REP. No. 2018, Feb. 22, 1995, sec. II, at 2; EUR. REP. No. 2037, Apr. 29, 1995,
sec. II, at 4. In connection with the commitment of Mario Monti, Financial Services and Internal
Market Commissioner, to the completion of the insurance program, see EUR. REP. No. 2040, May
10, 1995, sec. 11, at 1.
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dated supervision in this area, however, the early drafts of the proposed Insurance
Group Directive have provided for solo-plus supervision with three capital options
being provided to prevent double-gearing in insurance groups.
The capital options had to be included to deal with the very distinct forms of
practice presently in operation across Europe. While the United Kingdom, Ire-
land, and The Netherlands have developed a deduction and aggregation method
which operates on a "bottom-up" basis, France and Spain use a "top-down"
form of accounting consolidation, with Denmark using a specific variant of deduc-
tion and aggregation. Any one of the three capital options provided will be deemed
to secure adequate protection and be recognized as providing regulatory equiva-
lence for the purposes of the proposed directive. Member States which do not
have any relevant legislative controls in place at present will be required to select
and implement one of the three options provided to ensure that a minimum set
of standards will be in place across Europe. It is also understood that reporting
obligations will be introduced in respect of intra-group transfers and additional
provisions included in connection with the exchange of information between
national regulators.
The difficulty which has arisen in connection with the adoptions of the Con-
glomerate Supervision Directive is that further work on the proposal cannot
proceed until agreement has been secured on the terms of the proposed Insurance
Group Directive. Even if agreement on insurance groups is possible in early
course, however, it has to be expected that difficulties will remain in achieving
a sufficient degree of equivalence between the full consolidation approach, appli-
cable to banking and investment firms in Europe, and the new solo-plus options,
being developed for insurance undertakings.
It has to be hoped that agreement on the final terms of the proposed Insurance
Group and Conglomerate Supervision Directives can be reached in early course
and that these measures may provide a valuable first model for the development
of international standards in the area of conglomerate supervision.
VIII. Conglomerate Law-Conclusions and Comment
In light of the continuing growth and importance of complex financial and mixed
conglomerates in global markets, it is essential that an effective and complete set
of supervisory and regulatory rules and practices be developed in early course to
protect the continued growth and stability of all of the separate markets involved.
One obvious difficulty which has arisen is in connection with the distinct
structural approaches adopted with regards to risk separation in the United States
and Japan, on the one hand, and in Europe and other countries, including many
emerging markets, on the other. The consequent parallel development of complex
Glass-Steagall and universal bank, and bank-assurance, based groups in global
financial markets has clearly created very significant complications in the develop-
ment of common standards of comparison and equivalence in these areas.
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Of more importance, however, are the very basic differences which arise in
the three principal financial sectors involved with regard to operational and sol-
vency risks and their ultimate susceptibility to systemic collapse, in particular,
as a result of possible loss transference within a single conglomerate.
It is in trying to achieve some comparable measure of supervisory and
regulatory equivalence in respect of these core differences and, in so doing,
to ensure a sufficient level of risk containment or insulation, but without
unnecessarily limiting the proper competitive development of the markets,
that the most significant challenges lie in international convergence. It has to be
hoped that the final form of the proposed European Conglomerate Supervision
Directive may provide a valuable model for the further development of global
standards in this area.
At this stage, the following comments may be made with regard to the develop-
ment of appropriate global standards for the regulation and supervision of financial
conglomerates:
(1) Complete supervisory systems must be developed which facilitate the
effective supervision of the legal and management structures of financial
and mixed conglomerates and of the separate activities undertaken. Ap-
propriate reporting obligations must be placed on regulated entities and
effective exchange of information systems maintained between all of the
relevant regulatory authorities within, and between, each of the countries
involved.
(2) In addition to these general supervisory arrangements, more detailed
systems must be developed for the assessment of capital sufficiency for
conglomerates, including confirmation of capital adequacy, capital qual-
ity, and capital distribution within a group. In the event of common or
harmonized standards being inappropriate, or impossible to agree, a set
of global capital options must be adopted which secure a sufficient degree
of equivalence in terms of risk containment or insulation and which are
capable of mutual acceptance by all participating authorities.
(3) With regard to specific regulatory controls, appropriate systems must be
developed to secure the suitability of management, both at the regulated
entity and group level, and of all controlling shareholders. Proper controls
must also be placed on the assumption of participations in financial and
nonfinancial subsidiary companies and joint venture arrangements.
(4) All supervisors must have power to refuse, withdraw, or restrict authori-
zation whenever a group, or any part of a group, is not subject to effective
supervision, which power might extend to include the giving of directions
as to place of incorporation or structure of operation.
(5) Appropriate safeguards must be developed to ensure that all of the risks
of actual or potential conflicts of interests can be prevented or effectively
contained, failing which business or trading restrictions should be im-
posed on specific undertakings.
VOL. 30, NO. 1
LAW OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES 95
(6) External auditors must be placed under appropriate reporting obligations
while every possible effort must be made to develop necessary conver-
gence in national and international accountancy standards in addition to
the commonly used U.S. generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) which may clearly be far from appropriate in many cases.
(7) Although a considerable degree of work has already been undertaken in
the development of adequate systems of cooperation and exchange of
information between national and international regulators, these efforts
must be continued so that a complete network of global supervisory and
regulatory relations can be established based on a sufficient degree of
contact and confidence to ensure the effective supervision of all national
and international conglomerates.
(8) The earlier work of the Tripartite Group of Regulators should be continued
in a more formal forum to make sure that an agreed set of common rules
or international guidelines for the effective supervision of conglomerates
can soon be developed. The efforts, to date, of the Tripartite Group must
be commended for the considerable results already achieved.
(9) At the present time, the most important operational guidelines in place
remain the 1992 Basle Principles for the Supervision of Financial Con-
glomerates. Although relatively brief in their terms, the Principles do
provide a valuable set of first rules for the proper identification and
treatment of the principal difficulties that arise in connection with the
supervision of financial and mixed conglomerates.
The Principles might, however, benefit from revision in light of the
recommendations made by the Tripartite Group in its 1995 Report. Fur-
ther amendments to the terms of the Capital Accord may also have to
be considered in due course. It may be that a revised set of Minimum
Standards for the Supervision of International Banks will be produced,
which incorporates the amended principles, or a separate set of minimum
standards issued for the supervision of financial and mixed conglomerates.
(10) Every attempt should be made to ensure that as many countries as possible
accept, and effectively implement, the agreed standards for the supervi-
sion of financial conglomerates in all relevant areas of activity. The work
of the Basle Committee has again been particularly impressive in this
regard, especially through the extensive network of relations developed
with other supervisory authorities, and regional groupings of supervisors,
throughout the world. Securities and insurance regulators should attempt
to develop comparable consistency in support for the rules adopted in
their respective areas of activity.
(11) Insofar as certain countries, or specific financial centers, may be reluctant
to introduce, or enforce, common standards for reasons of competitive,
or comparative, advantage in a particular financial sector, all available
forms of economic or political pressure must be used to ensure compliance
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and to develop a complete global response to the difficulties created by
conglomerate forms of business. It is essential that any gaps or faults
which arise in the supervision of an individual institution are corrected
at an early stage, failing which supervisors must exercise their powers
of restriction or revocation.
(12) The provisional systems of new conglomerate law that are emerging in
many countries are clearly very important steps in the creation of a larger
global response to the need to develop a complete set of rules and adminis-
trative provisions for the effective management and control of the opera-
tions of internationally active financial institutions. Every effort should,
however, be made to ensure that all domestic laws and administrative
practices faithfully and fairly implement the relevant international guide-
lines so that all providers of financial services can compete on safe,
but equal, terms without any local market distortions being created and
possibility of regulatory arbitrage arising in the area of conglomerate
supervision.
(13) These domestic provisions, and the international rules on which they are
based, must, of course, be reviewed regularly and revised to ensure that
flexible but effective responses are always possible as the structure and
operation of the financial markets and financial operators change.
(14) Every opportunity should also be taken in developing the new rules to
extend the effectiveness of any related areas of regulatory control, for
example, with regard to money laundering or antifraud provisions, or in
any other important area of legal or regulatory concern.
(15) One area of considerable residual difficulty which may arise is in connec-
tion with the coordination of national and international lender of last
resort operations. This is clearly important in light of the increasingly
close relations and consequent interdependence being created between
all domestic and international financial markets. Even if complete
agreement on this sensitive issue may be impossible in the short term,
further efforts should be made to develop appropriate understandings or
general guidelines over time to ensure that contagion caused by the failure
of a particular conglomerate does not result in national or international
market collapse.
(16) It is clear that a considerable amount of significant preparatory work
has already taken place in the area of conglomerate supervision, and a
substantial amount of initial progress achieved. It can only be hoped that
the success of these efforts can continue and that a complete and effective
set of controls for the supervision of financial conglomerates can be
developed in early course. Success in this area will ensure that all national
and international financial sectors can continue to grow and develop in
a safe and stable manner and that the extensive opportunities being created
in the new global markets for financial services can be fully realized.
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